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Abstract 
 
For entirely valid reasons practitioners urge researchers to develop within-
subjects lie detection methods. This article highlights some problems with the existing 
and popular nonverbal baseline lie detection method and with the use of the Validity 
Checklist in SVA. The article further suggests how verbal within-subjects lie detection 
methods can be introduced in interview settings by implementing verbal lie detection 
interview protocols designed in recent years. The article concludes that these within-
subjects methods do not provide the ultimate solution as clear cut-off scores cannot be 
established, but they are a step forward in verbal lie detection.  
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Baselining as a Lie Detection Method 
 In private talks with practitioners, they often stress the importance of ‘within-
subjects’ lie detection tools. That is, they wish to make a decision about the veracity 
status of an interviewee by comparing different responses made by the same interviewee 
during a single interview. This request makes perfect sense. There are large individual 
differences in people’s behaviour, speech and physiological responses (DePaulo & 
Friedman, 1998). Some people typically make many movements, others do not; some 
people are eloquent, others are not; some people show large variations in physiological 
responses, others do not, and so on. Therefore, simple decision rules such as ‘He makes 
many movements, so he must be lying’ or ‘He does not say much, so he must be lying’ will 
not work. In physiological (polygraph) lie detection this is widely acknowledged and the 
two main polygraph tests, the Comparison Question Test (Raskin, 1982, 1986; Raskin & 
Honts, 2002) and the Concealed Information Test (Lykken, 1959, 1998; Verschuere, Ben-
Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011) are both within-subjects tests. Within the polygraph world the 
debate is heated about which questions to ask to make an adequate within-subjects 
comparison (Ben-Shakhar, 2008; Grubin, 2008; Vrij, 2008), but the within-subjects 
comparisons are less prominent in the (non)verbal lie detection domain. In this article I will 
focus on within-subjects designs in (non)verbal  lie detection. I will discuss some of the 
problems and possible solutions.  
The problems 
Nonverbal Baselining 
 Investigators trained in interrogation techniques such as the Reid technique are 
advised to examine a suspect’s natural, truthful, behaviour at the beginning of an 
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interview through small talk (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013, p.140). Similarly, in 
the Improving Interpersonal Evaluations for Law Enforcement and National Security 
technique, investigators are instructed to observe the interviewees’ normal mode of 
behaviour (baseline behaviour) when asking non-threatening background questions 
(Frank, Yarbrough, & Ekman, 2006). Investigators are encouraged to take note of how 
expressive interviewees are; how much movement they show in their hands, feet, and 
head; what words they use; and what tone of voice they express. This behaviour is then 
used as a baseline comparison with the investigative part of the interview, whereby any 
difference in response between the baseline and investigative part of the interview could 
be interpreted as a sign of deceit.  
 This baseline lie detection technique has been described as one of the most 
striking misuses of psychological research (Moston & Engelberg, 1993). Fundamental 
differences exist between small talk and the investigative part of the interview. Small-talk 
conversations are low-stakes situations where the suspect’s responses are unlikely to have 
any negative consequences. In contrast, the investigative part of the interview is a high-
stakes situation that can have negative consequences for the suspect in case s/he will not 
be believed by the investigator. As a result, both guilty and innocent people are likely to 
exhibit different behaviours during small talk compared with the actual interview 
(Hartwig & Bond, 2014), and this ‘apple–orange’ comparison will be prone to incorrect 
judgements (Moston & Engelberg, 1993).  
 In other words, when making baseline comparisons in the way investigators are 
taught to do, they fail to take situational factors into account, which is the notion that the 
same person behaves differently in different situations. This is a well-known error in 
                                                                                                          Baselining 5 
social perception, called the fundamental attribution error: the tendency to overlook the 
impact of situations when explaining someone’s responses (Ross, 1977). There are 
several situational factors, other than stakes, that affect someone’s behaviour. People 
react differently: (i) in a formal setting compared with an informal setting (Vrij, 2008); 
(ii) when they are accused of wrongdoing compared with when they are unchallenged 
(Vrij, 2006); and (iii) when interviewed by different people (Vrij & Winkel, 1991). In 
addition, behaviour is topic related. People will respond differently when discussing an 
embarrassing topic compared with a neutral topic (Kleinke, 1986) or a topic they care 
about compared with one that they have no interest in (Davis & Hadiks, 1995; Matarazzo, 
Wiens, Jackson, & Manaugh, 1970). Finally, behaviour can change over time. This can 
be either in the same interview (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon, Buller, White, Afifi, 
& Buslig, 1999; Stiff, Corman, Krizek, & Snider, 1994; White & Burgoon, 2001) or 
between interviews held on more than one occasion (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002).  
 An example of how baseline comparisons can go wrong is a real life high-stakes 
deception study in which 23 verbal and non-verbal cues were observed, displayed by 
former US President Bill Clinton during his Grand Jury Testimony about his alleged 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky (Hirsch & Wolf, 2001). The authors compared a 23-
minute segment of the videotape in which Clinton denied having committed various acts 
of a sexual nature with Monica Lewinsky with 11 minutes of the same testimony when he 
answered basic questions (his name, his attorney’s name, etc.). Significant differences 
were obtained for 19 cues. Additionally, the 23-minute segment was compared with a 
five-minute section of a fundraising speech to a sympathetic crowd. This time, 20 
significant differences emerged. Based on these analyses, it cannot be concluded that 
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Clinton showed 19 or 20 cues to deceit, as Hirsch and Wolf suggested, because the 
comparisons made between the truthful and deceptive statements were unfair. It seems 
obvious that a person will show different behaviours when answering basic questions or 
addressing a crowd in a fundraising speech than when interviewed about an alleged 
affair.  
 Although the baseline lie detection method is frequently advocated in 
interrogation techniques and frequently used (Moston & Engelberg, 1993), it has received 
virtually no attention from researchers. I could only find one published study (Ewens, 
Vrij, Jang, & Jo, 2014). In that study, similar to the recommendations in the police 
literature, truthful baseline behaviour was established prior to the interview through a 
non-threatening question (‘You just read and signed an informed consent form, could you 
please tell me what you remember about it and what it said’?). The investigative part of 
the interview then followed in which the interviewee was aware that s/he would be 
assessed on whether s/he was lying. During the investigative part, interviewees either 
discussed the job that they had (truth tellers) or pretended to have (liars). Two target 
periods were introduced. Target period 1 was at the beginning of the interview, almost 
immediately after the truthful baseline was established, whereas Target period 2 occurred 
almost at the end of the interview. In Target 1 interviewees answered the question: 
‘Please describe your place of work in as much detail as you can?’ and for Target period 
2 they answered: ‘If you were training me to do your job for a day, what things would I 
need to know about it?’ The extent to which interviewees looked nervous, gave the 
impression to having to think hard, or attempted to control themselves was assessed. Both 
liars and truth tellers’ behavioural patterns differed to the same extent between the 
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baseline behaviour and the investigative parts of the interview, which means that the 
nonverbal baseline technique did not receive empirical support.  
Verbal Baselining 
  Two verbal lie detection tools are used in the field, Statement Validity 
Assessment (SVA, Köhnken & Steller, 1988; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) and Scientific 
Content Analysis (SCAN, Sapir, 1987/2000; Vrij, 2008). In SCAN no attention is paid to 
the fact that individual differences in speech occur and no effort is made to control for 
such differences. In SVA the problem of individual differences is acknowledged. SVA 
consists of several phases including a criteria-based content analysis (CBCA) and a 
Validity Checklist phase. During the CBCA phase a trained coder rates a transcripts for 
the occurrence (presence or absence) of 19 different CBCA criteria, and calculates a 
CBCA score, which typically varies from 0 (no criterion is present) to 19 (all criteria are 
present). Truthful accounts are thought to be richer in quality than deceptive accounts and 
this is reflected in the number of criteria present: The more criteria present, the more 
likely it is that a statement is truthful. There is indeed empirical support for this 
assumption (Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015;   Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016; 
Oberlader, Naefgen, Koppehele-Gossel, Quinten, Banse, & Schmidt, 2016; Vrij, 2005), 
yet there is a problem. CBCA scores are affected by factors other than veracity including 
age and cognitive development, suggestibility, and quality of the interview. In an attempt 
to control for these factors a Validity Checklist has been developed (Vrij, 2005, 2008). 
The Validity Checklist consists of factors thought to be worth examining because they 
may have affected the CBCA score. By systematically addressing each of the factors 
mentioned on the Validity Checklist, the SVA evaluator explores and considers 
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alternative interpretations of the CBCA outcomes. Each time an alternative interpretation 
is rejected, it strengthens the assumption that the CBCA score accurately reflects the 
veracity of the statement, whereas each time an alternative interpretation is thought to be 
plausible, the evaluator should consider whether the CBCA score accurately reflects the 
veracity of the statement. 
 Assessing the impact of the factors Validity Checklist factors on a CBCA score 
remains a difficult task. Some factors are difficult to measure, and even if factors can be 
measured it is often difficult to assess their exact impact. A factor difficult to measure is 
susceptibility to suggestion. Some interviewees are more prone to an interviewer’s 
suggestions than are others. The danger is that a suggestible person may be inclined to 
provide information that confirms the interviewer’s expectations but that, in fact, is 
inaccurate. Accordingly, Yuille (1988) and Landry and Brigham (1992) have 
recommended asking the interviewee a few misleading questions at the end of the 
interview to assess his or her susceptibility to suggestion. Because asking such questions 
about central information could harm the statement (it could contaminate someone’s 
memory; Loftus, 2005; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999), Yuille 
(1988) recommends focusing on peripheral information (e.g., ‘‘When you were with your 
sister, which friend was also there, Claire or Sarah?’’ when the interviewer is aware that 
there was no friend present). However, being restricted to asking questions about 
peripheral information is problematic because interviewees show more resistance to 
suggestibility for central aspects of an event than for peripheral aspects of an event 
(Dalton & Daneman, 2006; Goodman, Rudy, Bottoms, & Aman, 1990; Porter, Spencer, 
& Birt, 2003), and they are more resistant to suggestibility for stressful events, most 
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likely the central information, than for less stressful events, most likely the peripheral 
information (Davies, 1991; Porter & Peace, 2007). Therefore, insight into interviewees’ 
suggestibility for peripheral parts of the event cannot be effectively used to draw 
conclusions about their suggestibility for core events.  
 Some Validity Checklist factors are easier to measure, but once measured it is still 
difficult or perhaps even impossible, to determine their exact impact on CBCA scores. 
The quality of interviewing, for example, can be measured and often influences the 
amount of information that an interviewee reports (Griffiths & Milne, 2006; Oxburg, Ost, & 
Cherryman, 2012; Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014). However, this does not mean that each 
individual interviewee will necessarily be affected by a particular interview style. And even 
if the interviewee was affected by the style of interviewing, it is often impossible to 
determine afterwards the precise impact this had on the quality of his/her statement. In other 
words, the precise impact of Validity Checklist factors on an individual statement can often 
not be determined, but only estimated. Obviously, mistakes in these estimations can occur. 
 A good illustration of the difficulty that SVA experts face in determining the exact 
impact of Validity Checklist factors on CBCA scores is the field study conducted by 
Lamers-Winkelman and Buffing (1996). In this study, raters were instructed to take the age 
of the child into account when calculating CBCA scores. Nevertheless, six criteria 
positively correlated with age. In other words, even after being instructed to correct 
CBCA scores for age, the results still showed age related effects with older children 
obtaining higher CBCA scores than younger children. 
 Given these difficulties in identifying the presence of Validity Checklist factors, 
and in examining the exact impact of these factors on CBCA scores, it is clear that the 
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Validity Checklist procedure is more subjective and less formalised than the CBCA 
procedure (Steller, 1989; Steller & Köhnken, 1989). It is therefore not surprising that if 
two experts disagree about the veracity of a statement, the most likely reason for the 
disagreement is that they disagree about the impact of Validity Checklist factors on that 
statement (Gumpert & Lindblad, 1999; Vrij, 2008). Neither it is therefore surprising that 
experts often ignore the outcomes of the Validity Checklist analysis. That is, SVA 
experts sometimes highlight the influence of Validity Checklist factors on statements in 
general, without discussing how these factors may have influenced the statement of the 
particular interviewee they were asked to assess. Also, experts sometimes indicate 
possible external influences on statements, but are then still inclined to rely upon the 
CBCA outcome, and tend to judge high-quality statements as truthful and low-quality 
statements as fabricated.  
The solutions 
Nonverbal Baselining 
 Given that nonverbal behaviours are affected by a variety of factors, discussed 
above, when investigators wish to compare a person’s deceptive nonverbal response with 
a truthful nonverbal response from the same person, they need to make sure that the 
deceptive and truthful responses are taken from the same interview setting; that the 
person talks about similar topics in the deceptive and truthful parts; and that these parts 
were discussed within a short period of time from each other. In that respect, Vrij (2008) 
refers to a comparable truth baseline. Comparable means that the baseline the 
investigator uses must be similar in content, context, stakes, and cognitive and emotional 
involvement to investigative questions (Vrij, 2008). 
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  In a recent study, such a comparable truth baseline was empirically tested (Palena, 
Vrij, Caso, & Orthey, 2016). In the baseline part of the interview truth tellers and liars 
truthfully reported three tasks they just had conducted. After that, in the investigative part 
of the interview in which truth tellers and liars were aware that their responses would be 
assessed in terms of veracity, truth tellers reported three more, but similar, tasks they had 
conducted, whereas liars pretended to have carried out these three additional tasks. 
Movements of arms, hands and fingers were assessed. Results indicated that truth tellers 
and liars changed their behaviours from the baseline to the investigative part of the 
interview to the same extent.  For truth tellers the tasks they described in the baseline and 
investigative parts of the interview were very similar. The main difference for them was 
that they were aware that their veracity status would be assessed in the investigative part 
of the interview and not in the baseline part of the interview.  This means that it will be 
virtually impossible to establish a reliable nonverbal baseline outside the investigative 
part of the interview, because truth tellers are aware that their veracity status is not 
assessed outside the investigative part of the interview. The only solution left over is to 
introduce a truthful baseline during the investigative part of the interview, but that may 
be difficult to achieve in real life, because investigators often do not know with any 
degree of certainty which (if any) of the details an interviewee reports during the 
investigative part of the interview are truthful. I am therefore pessimistic about the 
development of a reliable nonverbal baseline lie detection method.  
Verbal Baselining 
 I am more optimistic about the possibility of developing verbal baseline lie 
detection methods. In fact, several of them already exist, and I will briefly introduce them 
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here. In recent years researchers started to develop interview protocols that elicit or 
enhance verbal cues to deception. The most frequently researched methods are cognitive 
lie detection, which consists of three elements, imposing cognitive load, encouraging 
interviewees to say more, and asking unexpected questions (Vrij, 2015; Vrij, Fisher, & 
Blank, 2016; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, & Blankaert, 2015), the verifiability approach 
(Vrij & Nahari, 2016; Vrij, Taylor, & Picornell, 2016) and the Strategic Use of Evidence 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). Each interview protocol 
contains within-subjects comparisons. 
Imposing cognitive load. Imposing cognitive load is based on the well-established 
empirical finding that in interview settings lying is typically more mentally taxing than 
truth telling (e.g., fMRI research, Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 
2009; Vrij & Ganis, 2014). Imposing cognitive load refers to investigators’ interventions 
aimed at making the interview setting mentally more difficult. Liars, who often require 
more cognitive resources than truth tellers in interviews settings, will have fewer 
cognitive resources left over. If cognitive demand is further raised, which could be 
achieved by making additional requests, liars may be less able than truth tellers to cope 
with these additional requests. One way to impose cognitive load is by asking 
interviewees to tell their stories in reverse order.  
The reverse order technique can be used as a within-subjects lie detection tool. 
Interviewees are first asked in an open-ended question to describe in detail what they 
have experienced. Interviews typically answer this question in chronological time order 
as that is how they have experienced the event they discuss (truth tellers) or have 
rehearsed the story they discuss (liars). After this free recall, interviewees are invited to 
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report the event again, but this time in reverse order. This is a technique commonly used 
in interviews with cooperative witnesses (truth tellers) as it typically leads to new 
information (reminiscences) (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Fisher, Schreiber Compo, 
Rivard, & Hirn, 2014). This instruction invites truth tellers to think about the event again, 
but from a different perspective. This often leads to reminiscences. Liars have shown to 
include fewer reminiscences than truth tellers (Ewens, Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 2016; Shaw et 
al., 2014; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012), probably for two reasons. First, they may 
see this as a test (‘Can I report again what I just reported, but now in reverse order?), 
because they are very much concerned with consistency, more so than truth tellers (Vrij, 
Fisher, Blank, Leal, & Mann, 2016). Liars typically believe that consistent statements 
will appear more credible, and, indeed, investigators often use this consistency heuristic 
(Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004; Vredeveldt, van Koppen, Granhag, 2014). Adding 
new information in the reverse order recall makes this recall less consistent with the 
initial chronological recall, so from a consistency perspective liars are unlikely to add 
new detail. Second, when liars are satisfied with their initial chronological recall, they 
will see no reason to add information when reporting the rehearsed story in reverse order, 
because this additional information may give investigators further leads to check the 
veracity of the statement. Apart from reminiscences, another verbal cue may distinguish 
truth tellers from liars. Reporting information in reverse order is mentally taxing, 
particularly for liars. The complexity of the task means that errors may occur in the form 
of contradictions between the chronological and reverse order control, particularly in liars 
(Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012). In sum, in comparing the chronological statement 
with the reverse order statement, the investigator should pay attention to reminiscences 
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and (if they occur) contradictions. Interviewees who add reminiscences are likely to be 
truthful, interviewees who do not add reminiscences are likely to be deceptive. 
Contradictions may provide further evidence that the interviewee was lying.  
Encouraging interviewees to say more. If people in daily conversations are asked a 
question about their activities, they rarely provide all the information they know (Vrij, 
Fisher, & Hope, 2014). Instead, they are likely to provide a summary of their activities, 
highlighting some core issues (‘I did some shopping in the morning, and had a BBQ in 
the evening’). Interviewees realise that in interview settings they have to provide more 
information than that but they still have inadequate expectations about how much detail is 
expected from them (Fisher, 2010; Fisher, Milne, & Bull, 2011).  
Investigators can alter the participants’ expectations about how much detail is 
required by providing them with a model answer, a detailed statement about an event 
unrelated to the topic of investigation. In a study in which the model statement was used, 
half of the interviewees who lied or told the truth about an insurance claim, listened to an 
audiotaped detail account of someone describing his experiences at a day attending 
Formula 2 motor racing. Interviewees who were exposed to this model statement gave 
twice as much information about their insurance claim than those who did not listen to 
the model statement (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 2015).  
The model statement technique allows investigators to make within-subjects 
comparisons. Start the interview with inviting the interviewee to report in as much detail 
as possible what s/he has experienced. After this initial recall, let him/her listen to a 
model statement and invite him/her again to report in as much detail as possible what s/he 
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has experienced. Unlike in the reverse order technique described above, liars will 
understand that more information is required from them after listening to the model 
statement. As a result, both truth tellers and liars will add more detail, but the type of 
detail they add is different. First, the additional detail sounds more plausible in truth 
tellers than in liars (Leal et al., 2015). Truth tellers can search their memories and add 
more detail to their story, whereas liars have to fabricate additional detail on the spot. The 
latter is mentally taxing and leads to reminiscences that do not sound as plausible as the 
truth tellers’ reminiscences. Second, truth tellers elaborate on the core and peripheral 
elements of their story, whereas liars mainly elaborate on the peripheral elements of their 
story. Liars prefer to avoid providing potentially incriminating information (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2008) and a possible solution is to talk around the core event and add less 
relevant information instead. Thus, in this method investigators should judge the 
plausibility of the reminiscences (truth tellers are more plausible) and the extent to which 
the additional information is about the core event (truth tellers elaborate more about the 
core event).  
Asking unexpected questions. A consistent finding in the deception literature is that liars 
prepare themselves for anticipated interviews by preparing possible answers to questions 
they expect to be asked (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). This strategy of 
preparing answers for possible questions makes sense. Planning makes lying easier and 
planned lies typically contain fewer cues to deceit than spontaneous lies (DePaulo et al., 
2003). However, preparing for answers has a limitation. It will be fruitful only if liars 
correctly anticipate which questions will be asked. Investigators can exploit this 
limitation by asking questions that liars do not anticipate. Though liars can refuse to 
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answer unexpected questions by saying “I don’t know” or “I can’t remember,” such 
responses will create suspicion if these questions are about central aspects of the target 
event. A liar, therefore, has little option other than to fabricate a plausible answer on the 
spot, which is cognitively demanding.  
 The unanticipated questions approach can be used as a within-subjects technique. 
For liars, expected questions should be easier to answer than unexpected questions, 
because they can give their planned and rehearsed answers to the expected questions but 
they need to fabricate answers to the unexpected questions. The difference liars 
experience in cognitive load while answering these two sets of questions should become 
evident in their verbal responses. In contrast, truth tellers experience similar levels of 
cognitive load while answering expected and unexpected questions, and they should 
produce more comparable answers to the expected and unexpected questions than liars.  
 To date, in the unexpected-questions technique, within-subjects comparisons have 
been made in three different manners, each of which examines a different outcome 
measure (e.g., dependent variable). In a first set of studies, truth tellers went on their 
missions in small groups, whereas liars pretended to have carried out such missions. They 
prepared themselves for the interview in these small groups but were interviewed 
separately. In the interview they were asked a mixture of expected and unexpected 
questions, and the answers given by the different individuals belonging to a group were 
compared to one another (Roos af Hjelmsäter, Ohman, Granhag, & Vrij, 2014; Vrij et al., 
2009). Liars showed less overlap in their answers to the unexpected questions than to the 
expected questions, whereas no difference emerged in truth tellers when comparing the 
expected and unexpected questions.  
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 In a second set of studies, individual truth tellers and liars were asked a mixture of 
expected and unexpected questions. People, including interviewers, pay attention to detail 
when making veracity judgments, and the richer an account is perceived to be in detail, 
the more likely it is to be believed (Bell & Loftus, 1989). Liars are aware of this and are 
therefore keen to provide details to make an honest impression (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 
2012). As a result, liars may prepare a detailed alibi and report it as soon as the 
opportunity arises. This opportunity does arise when an expected question is asked. In 
contrast, liars will not have prepared answers for unexpected questions and may therefore 
struggle to generate detailed answers. For truth tellers, the difference in detail between 
expected and unexpected questions should be less pronounced. When asked about an 
event they have experienced, truth tellers will search their memories for details about that 
event and there is no reason why those details are less accessible for unexpected than for 
expected questions, as long as the expected and unexpected questions are both about core 
aspects of the event. Therefore, as research has shown, liars’ prepared answers to 
expected questions are more detailed than the truth tellers’ answers to expected questions, 
because it is easier to recall a planned story (e.g., liars) than to search memory for details 
(e.g., truth tellers). In contrast, liars‘ answers to unexpected questions are less detailed 
than truth tellers’ answers to unexpected questions, because it may be more difficult to 
fabricate an answer (e.g., liars) than to search memory for details (e.g., truth tellers) 
(Knieps, Granhag, & Vrij, 2013; Lancaster, Vrij, Hope,  & Waller, 2012; Warmelink, 
Vrij, Mann, Jundi, & Granhag, 2012).  
 In a third set of studies individual truth tellers and liars were interviewed and were 
asked the same unexpected question twice. The overlap in the two answers was examined 
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(Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012; Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 2011). When liars have 
not anticipated the question, they have to fabricate an answer on the spot. A liar’s 
memory of this fabricated answer may be more unstable than a truth teller’s actual 
memory of the event. Therefore, liars should contradict themselves more than truth tellers 
when they are asked the same unexpected question twice, and this may be particularly the 
case when the question is asked twice in different formats (e.g., verbal recall versus 
sketching). Truth tellers will have encoded the topic of investigation along more 
dimensions than will liars. As a result, compared with liars, truth tellers should be able to 
recall the event more flexibly (along more dimensions). For example, in Leins, Fisher, 
and Vrij’s (2012) experiment truthful participants had visited a room whereas deceptive 
participants had not. In the interview however, all participants claimed to have visited the 
room. Participants were asked to verbally recall the layout of the room twice, to sketch it 
twice, or to verbally recall it once and to sketch it once. Liars contradicted themselves 
more than truth tellers, but only in the verbal recall – drawing condition. In other words, 
for this within-subjects comparison to work it appears to be necessary that the 
interviewee answers the same question in different formats.  
 In sum, the unexpected questions technique can be executed in different ways, 
and each of the three ways in which it has been employed to date has been fruitful in 
terms of eliciting verbal cues to deceit and distinguishing between truth tellers and liars 
using within-subjects lie detection methods.  
Verifiability Approach. Central to the Verifiability Approach are two 
assumptions. First, truth tellers typically include more detail into their accounts than liars 
(Vrij, 2008). Observers seem to be aware of this, as the richer an account is perceived to 
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be in detail, the more likely it is to be believed (Bell & Loftus, 1989). As a result, liars are 
inclined to provide many details to make an honest impression on observers (Nahari, 
Vrij, & Fisher, 2012). Second, liars prefer to avoid mentioning too many details out of 
fear that investigators can check such details and will discover that they are lying (Nahari 
et al., 2012). A strategy that compromises between these two conflicting motivations is to 
provide details that cannot be verified. Verifiable detail include: Activities i) carried out 
with or ii) witnessed by named persons or persons who can be identified by their 
description who the interviewer can consult; iii) activities that the interviewee believes 
may have been captured on CCTV; and iv) activities that lead a trace, such as activities 
that have been recorded through technology (using debit cards, mobile phones, or 
computers). Indeed, results of all six Verifiability Approach studies published to date 
revealed that liars include fewer verifiable details than truth tellers (Harvey, Vrij, Nahari, 
& Ludwig, 2015; Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a, b; Nahari, Leal, 
Vrij, Warmelink, & Vernham, 2014; Vrij, Nahari, Isitt, & Leal, 2016). Interestingly, this 
verifiability effect becomes stronger if interviewees are asked at the beginning of the 
interview to incorporate (if possible) details that the investigator can check (Harvey, Vrij, 
Nahari, & Ludwig, 2015; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014b; Vrij, Nahari, Isitt, & Leal, 
2016). The within-subjects aspect of this method is that the proportion of verifiable 
details (verifiable details / verifiable and unverifiable details) is higher for truth tellers 
than for liars.  
Strategic Use of Evidence. Liars and truth tellers enter interviews with different counter-
interrogation strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Liars are inclined to use avoidance 
strategies (e.g., in a free recall avoid mentioning where they were at a certain time) or 
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denial strategies (e.g., denying having been at a certain place at a certain time when asked 
directly) (Hartwig et al., 2007). In contrast, truth tellers are generally more forthcoming 
and “tell the truth like it happened” (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2007; Kassin, 2005). When 
investigators possess critical and possibly incriminating background information 
(evidence) in a case, they can exploit these differential truth tellers’ and liars’ strategies 
by introducing the available evidence during the interview in a strategic manner. When 
questions about the evidence are asked, liars use more avoidance strategies, whereas truth 
tellers use more forthcoming strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). The result is that 
truth tellers’ accounts are more consistent with the available evidence than liars’ accounts 
(Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). 
 Apart from this statement – evidence inconsistency, the SUE technique also elicits 
within– statement inconsistency, which is a within-subjects examination. During SUE 
interviews liars may start to become aware that the investigator possesses a piece of 
evidence liars initially did not think the investigator possessed. Liars then tend to adjust 
their story somewhat in an effort to provide a plausible but innocent explanation for that 
piece of evidence. Research has shown that this results in liars contradicting what they 
said previously (within – statement inconsistency, Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). For 
example, a liar who tries to hide the fact that he used a safe at a train station on a 
particular Sunday afternoon may initially deny to have been at the train station on that 
Sunday afternoon. However, after realising that the investigator may have evidence that 
he was at the train station on that Sunday afternoon, he may now adjust his story by 
saying that he was at the train station (albeit not to use a safe).  
Applying Verbal Baselining in Real Life 
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Applying verbal baselining in real life is challenging. Baselining methods would 
be most effective if truth tellers and liars display truly different response patterns, for 
example, if truth tellers always include more verifiable than unverifiable details in their 
statements and liars always include more unverifiable than verifiable details in their 
statements (e.g. Nahari & Vrij, 2015; Nahari et al., 2014a). In that case a clear cut-off 
score can be established, but this does not happen in real life. All that can be concluded is 
that truth tellers typically include a higher proportion of verifiable details in their 
statements than liars. This still leaves practitioners with the following problem: When is 
the proportion of verifiable details high enough to decide that the interviewee is telling 
the truth? Yet, the benefit of using within-subject measures compared to between-
subjects measures still exists. If just ‘amount of detail’ is considered, the problem arises 
that the amount of detail will not only be affected by veracity but also by individual 
differences in being eloquent or preparedness (well prepared answers are likely to be 
longer than spontaneous answers). Those additional factors play a lesser role in within-
subjects comparisons. That is, it is no longer relevant how detailed an answer is (which is 
largely influenced by being eloquent and prepared) but it becomes relevant how many 
verifiable and unverifiable details are included (more likely to be influenced by veracity).  
Conclusion 
 For entirely valid reasons practitioners urge researchers to develop within-
subjects lie detection methods. In this article I highlighted some problems with the 
existing and popular nonverbal baseline lie detection method and with the use of the 
Validity Checklist in SVA. I further highlighted how verbal within-subjects lie detection 
methods can be introduced in interview settings by implementing verbal lie detection 
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interview protocols designed in recent years. Although within-subject lie detection 
methods do not provide the ultimate solution, they can be seen as an improvement. 
Hopefully this article will make practitioners think about how to correctly use verbal 
within-subjects lie detection methods and will encourage researchers to pay more 
attention to the important issue of within-subjects verbal lie detection.  
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